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Articles 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic 
Institutional Reform 
RICHARD C. CHEN* 
The bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) signed be-
tween developed and developing countries are sup-
posed to increase the flow of investment from the for-
mer to the latter.  But the evidence indicates that the 
existing approach of guaranteeing special protections 
for foreign investors has only a modest impact on lur-
ing their dollars.  At the same time they are failing to 
produce meaningful benefits, these treaty commit-
ments create substantial costs for the host States that 
make them, exposing them to liability and constrain-
ing their regulatory authority.  Given this state of im-
balance, the time seems ripe for a new approach, but 
existing proposals for revising BITs are either insuffi-
cient or unrealistic, or in some instances even coun-
terproductive. 
This Article calls for a fundamental redesign of BITs 
based on empirically validated premises about how 
host States actually attract foreign investment.  Politi-
cal science and economic studies show that foreign 
investors place substantial weight on the quality of 
domestic institutions.  Existing BITs fail to promote 
investment because they are not an adequate substi-
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the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and a faculty workshop at the University of 
Maine School of Law.  Thanks also to William Wahrer for excellent research assistance. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942792 
Chen_BITs and Domestic Institutional Reform_for final approval (with comments) (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2017  4:35 PM 
548 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [55:547 
tute for these institutions, nor are they effective in 
generating reform.  The proposed model would make 
domestic institutional reform the organizing principle 
of BIT design, and the Article offers several specific 
provisions that would help achieve that goal.  Such an 
approach would produce immediate benefits for host 
States and so should be particularly attractive to de-
veloping countries.  But the institutional reform model 
also retains the end goal shared by both sides of in-
creasing foreign investment and so should be more 
realistically attainable than proposals pitched as ben-
efiting developing States alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The stated purpose of most bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) is to foster economic cooperation between the States that 
sign them, primarily by promoting the flow of capital from developed 
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to developing countries.
1
  Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that 
the features of most BITs are no longer optimized, if they ever were, 
to achieve that goal.  A number of empirical studies have found that 
BITs do not actually succeed in increasing foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”), while other studies have found at most a modest impact.2 
The existing BIT model, which has largely remained static 
since at least the 1980s, emphasizes investor protection.
3
  The mod-
el’s underlying assumption is that BITs succeed in attracting capital 
to a developing State by promising foreign investors a special set of 
substantive rights and procedural options, as a way to compensate for 
the risks posed by a precarious political regime or immature legal 
system.
4
  The empirical literature finding only modest effects on FDI 
now casts doubt on that assumption.  And at the same time that BITs 
appear to be failing to produce their expected benefits, they are creat-
ing substantial costs for capital-importing States, both in terms of ex-
posing the State to investment treaty liability and constraining its 
regulatory authority.
5
 
This Article calls for a reexamination of the foundational 
premises of BIT design.  To do so, it looks to empirical research out-
side the BIT context, studying other potential influences on FDI 
growth.  While commitments made in international agreements ap-
pear to have minimal effect on foreign investment, the quality of a 
host State’s domestic institutions has been shown to make a more 
significant difference.  Although particular studies differ on which 
specific institutional factors matter and to what extent, the empirical 
literature is generally consistent in finding that foreign investors take 
 
 1. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:  An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
67, 76 (2005). 
 2. See Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign 
Direct Investment:  A Political Analysis, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT:  BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS 171, 176–78 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) 
(summarizing studies). 
 3. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 74, 76. 
 4. See id. at 77. 
 5. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  A 
GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 12–15 
(2004), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_invest_and_sd.pdf.  Some commentators 
have further suggested that BITs may affirmatively harm a host State’s economy by 
transferring control over domestic assets to foreign investors.  See Joshua Boone, How 
Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits 
to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 187, 190–92 (2011). 
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institutional quality into account in making investment decisions.
6
  
Based on this empirical evidence, I argue that BITs should be rede-
signed to focus on improving domestic institutions as the optimal 
way of achieving the ultimate goal of increasing FDI. 
As the evidence that BITs are failing to achieve their intended 
purpose continues to mount, many have offered ideas to improve on 
the status quo.  Most scholars have focused on marginal changes that 
retain the basic premises of the investor protection model.
7
  But as I 
demonstrate below, these changes would at best reduce the costs of 
BITs by pushing back against their intrusion on host State sovereign-
ty.  They are not designed to promote the benefits of increased FDI 
that BITs are supposed to yield.  More recently, commentators have 
begun to brainstorm possibilities for a more systemic overhaul.  
These critics are particularly concerned that, even when developing 
States succeed in attracting foreign investment, they often fail to ex-
tract the benefits they expect from the relationship, such as gains in 
economic development.
8
  Thus, they propose an alternative BIT 
model repurposed to specifically promote the development of host 
States. 
The difficulty with the more systemic proposals—perhaps 
why they have yet to gain traction—is that they are framed primarily 
around the objectives of only one of the interested parties.  By con-
trast, my argument for an institutional reform model makes the case 
that it is a better bargain for both sides.  Although key premises are 
reevaluated, the end goal remains the same as that for which the in-
vestor protection model was purportedly designed, namely promoting 
FDI.  And it is important to remember that increased FDI is in the in-
terests of not just the importing State but also the exporting State, 
which benefits when its investors find more opportunities in better 
markets.  Thus, the argument for domestic reform is not about devel-
opment for the host State’s sake alone, but about the prospects of a 
better partnership for everyone involved. 
At the same time that the proposed model seeks to benefit 
both sides, it also addresses a particular need of developing countries.  
 
 6. See, e.g., Matthias Busse & Carsten Hefeker, Political Risk, Institutions and 
Foreign Direct Investment, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 397, 400–01, 410 (2007); Zdenek Drabek 
& Warren Payne, The Impact of Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment, 17 J. ECON. 
INTEGRATION 777, 785–87 (2002). 
 7. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power:  Is Investment 
Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 831 (2008) (proposing ways to recalibrate investment 
arbitration so that it strikes a better balance between public and private interests). 
 8. See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 5, at v–vi. 
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Whereas the investor protection model left host States to hope that 
increased FDI would eventually translate, in some undetermined 
manner, into benefits they could capture, the institutional reform 
model is specifically designed to produce such benefits.  That is be-
cause improving domestic institutions for the particular benefit of 
host States is the means to the shared end of increased FDI.  The 
benefits, in other words, are built-in rather than contingent.  Thus, 
while the institutional reform model may not accomplish everything 
that advocates for developing countries would desire, its adoption 
would significantly advance their objectives even while serving the 
overlapping interests of capital-exporting States. 
The Article will proceed in four parts.  Part I will provide an 
overview of existing BITs and evaluate how well they are serving 
their intended purpose.  In particular, after explaining how the inves-
tor protection model is supposed to promote FDI, this Part will ex-
plore evidence suggesting that it has largely failed to do so.  Part II 
will detail existing reform efforts, including both the incremental 
proposals that merely tinker with the investor protection framework 
and the systemic proposals that repurpose BITs as instruments for 
host State development.  Part III will make the case for the shift in 
focus to improving domestic institutions, replacing investor protec-
tion with what I will call an institutional reform model.  This Part 
will detail the general evidence showing that the quality of domestic 
institutions is a significant determinant of foreign investment deci-
sions and highlight the key variables that have been shown to matter 
most.  This Part will also elaborate on the argument that an institu-
tional reform model has the potential to be a better bargain for all in-
terested stakeholders and thus is more realistically attainable than al-
ternative proposals. 
Part IV will then attempt to translate the new model into three 
specific proposals, drawing on the key variables identified in the pri-
or Part.  First, BITs should incorporate conditional aid and technical 
assistance provisions.  In a conditional aid program, the capital-
exporting country would provide aid to the capital-importing country, 
with continued receipt being dependent on the achievement of certain 
benchmarks.  In a technical assistance program, experts would be 
sent to work with the relevant actors in the host State to build the ca-
pacity of domestic institutions.  Prior or existing efforts in both of 
these regards have seen minimal success in fostering institutional re-
form.  I argue that establishing such programs under the auspices of a 
BIT relationship, where each party has a clearer interest in effective 
long-term cooperation, has the potential to yield greater returns. 
Conditional aid and technical assistance are the most direct 
ways to address institutional reform, but they would require a signifi-
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cant investment of resources and are far removed from what BITs 
currently contain.  The second and third proposals would more readi-
ly fit into the existing structure, but are better described as facilitat-
ing, rather than directly contributing to, the desired reform.  The sec-
ond proposal involves a redesign of the standard dispute resolution 
mechanism to maximize incentives for host States to improve their 
domestic judiciaries.  Rather than providing for arbitration at the 
election of the foreign investor, the revised approach would permit 
arbitration only under certain conditions designed to pressure host 
States that would prefer to resolve disputes in their own courts to 
pursue reform.  The third proposal involves establishing a dispute 
prevention mechanism that would attempt to address foreign investor 
complaints before they escalate.  Apart from resolving individual 
complaints, such a mechanism could also serve as a focal point for 
coordinating broader reform of the institutions that write and admin-
ister the host State’s laws. 
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly acknowledging a differ-
ent implication of the empirical evidence that will not be my focus 
here.  Given the evidence that BITs, as currently designed, may be 
producing more costs than benefits, there is a plausible argument that 
the substantive rights provided under the investor protection model 
should be scaled back.  In other words, if the presence of BIT protec-
tions is not attracting FDI, why leave them in place to be used against 
host States by aggrieved foreign investors?  At the very least, an ap-
proach that better balances investor protection and host State sover-
eignty would seem to be warranted, and commentators have proposed 
ways in which specific substantive protections should be recalibrated 
accordingly.  I discuss these proposals in Section II.A and believe 
some of them may well be compatible with my own, but I bracket the 
question of whether and to what extent a recalibration is needed.  My 
proposals below assume that some degree of investment protection 
would remain in place, but this Article is otherwise agnostic as to the 
specific scope that protection should entail. 
As a final caveat, I should also emphasize that I am focused 
here on BITs between developed and developing countries, which 
account for the majority of such treaties.
9
  An increasing number of 
BITs do involve developing States on both sides, and some even in-
volve two developed nations or other pairs in which there is a “good 
chance of reciprocal investment.”10  Investment provisions have also 
appeared in multilateral free trade agreements, and the trend appears 
 
 9. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 74. 
 10. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:  Actors and Analogies Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 91 (2013). 
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to be going in the direction of more regional treatymaking.
11
  Need-
less to say, the dynamics of all these relationships are very different, 
and making progress on just one BIT paradigm would constitute a 
worthwhile endeavor. 
I. THE INVESTOR PROTECTION MODEL 
This Part begins with an overview of BITs and how the cur-
rent investor protection model is supposed to promote foreign in-
vestment.  It then evaluates the success of that model, drawing on the 
empirical literature measuring the impact of BITs as well as discuss-
ing reasons in principle to be pessimistic. 
A. The Basic Paradigm 
The modern BIT was created in the 1950s, but its content 
continued to evolve into the late 1980s, when the basic structure that 
still predominates began to take shape.
12
  The 1980s marked a turning 
point because, as the communist era came to an end, many States that 
were formerly closed off to foreign investment developed an interest 
in attracting outside capital.
13
  That change resulted in a dramatic in-
crease in the number of BITs, from 309 in place as of 1988 to 2181 
by 2002, most of them concluded between developing States on the 
one side and industrialized nations on the other.
14
 
These BITs took the form of what commentators have called 
a “grand bargain.”15  Developing countries see foreign investment as 
a way to spur their own growth and development.
16
  That is supposed 
to occur both through the infusion of needed capital and the deploy-
ment of technology.
17
  Capital-exporting nations, in turn, have an in-
terest in facilitating the entry of their investors into new markets.
18
  
One potential obstacle to an otherwise attractive market is the pres-
 
 11. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2012:  Towards a 
New Generation of Investment Policies, at xx (2012) [hereinafter World Investment Report 
2012], http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf. 
 12. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 73–75. 
 13. Id. at 74. 
 14. Id. at 75. 
 15. Id. at 77. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 76. 
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ence of political and legal risks.  The concern is that, once an investor 
begins a venture in and commits resources to a particular host State, 
that State will change the rules in a way that benefits itself and harms 
the investor.
19
  Recourse under the host State’s domestic law, and 
pursued in the local courts, is likely to be inadequate, particularly in 
developing countries with immature legal systems.
20
  BITs attempt to 
remove this obstacle by supplying, via international agreement, the 
investment protection that domestic law fails to adequately guaran-
tee.  In short, the grand bargain entails the host State’s “promise of 
protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the 
future.”21 
What specifically does this promise encompass?  The typical 
BIT contains substantive protections for investors, ranging from pro-
hibitions on expropriations without compensation to guarantees of 
fair and equitable treatment, of full protection and security, and 
against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.
22
  It also includes pro-
cedural guarantees, most importantly the option of resolving disputes 
with the host State in a neutral arbitral forum such as the Internation-
al Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).23  For-
eign investors are thereby permitted to bypass the host State’s domes-
tic courts to challenge government regulations or other actions before 
a panel of international arbitrators and obtain relief that is supposed 
to be enforceable in the courts without further review.
24
 
In principle, the provisions described above could operate 
neutrally, striking a fair balance between the concerns of investors 
and needs of host States.  On their face, the substantive guarantees 
seem like perfectly sensible assurances of fair treatment, and the pro-
cedural option of a neutral arbiter seems like a reasonable safeguard 
against potential bias in domestic courts.  In practice, however, the 
substantive protections have been interpreted in a way that is per-
ceived as overly generous to investors, and the tribunals charged with 
enforcing them are seen as biased in favor of investors.
25
  To illus-
 
 19. Id. at 75. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. at 77 (emphasis omitted). 
 22. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 13 (2d ed. 2012). 
 23. Id. at 13, 239. 
 24. Id. at 239. 
 25. See, e.g., Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Developing Countries in the Investment 
Treaty System:  A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE GAP 43, 51–61 (Stephan W. Schill et al. eds., 2015) 
(criticizing the expansive interpretation of BIT principles to privilege investor protection 
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trate, tribunals have interpreted the fair and equitable treatment to re-
quire “the stability of the legal and business framework.”26  Although 
most tribunals acknowledge that this requirement does not go so far 
as to freeze in place the preexisting regulatory scheme, they have 
struggled to draw a principled line, and their emphasis on stability 
opens the door for nearly any regulatory change to be challenged.
27
  
Another commonly cited formulation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard provides as follows: 
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, 
so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as 
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its invest-
ment and comply with such regulations.
28
 
Commentators have pointed out that this formulation of the standard 
far exceeds what any country, developing or not, could expect to 
achieve.
29
  Thus, the protections afforded to foreign investors have 
likely exceeded what those same investors could have expected from 
their own home States. 
The criticisms may be overstated.  For example, Susan Franck 
has shown that investors do not prevail at an unusually high rate; her 
2007 study finds that investors won 38.5% of the time.
30
  Moreover, 
the investors who prevailed recovered far less than they initially 
sought.
31
  In any event, tribunal practice continues to evolve, and it 
may well be headed toward a more balanced approach. 
But the fact remains that investment treaty claims that many 
would deem quite aggressive are at least viable under existing inter-
pretations of BIT provisions.  For example, commentators reacted 
with alarm when Philip Morris brought claims challenging the regu-
 
over host State sovereignty). 
 26. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶ 125 (Oct. 3, 2006). 
 27. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 145–49. 
 28. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003). 
 29. See Sornarajah, supra note 25, at 56–57, 57 n.30. 
 30. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48–52 (2007). 
 31. Id. at 57–64. 
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lation of cigarette packaging.
32
  The prevailing sentiment was that 
good-faith legislation designed to promote public health should not 
be subjected to potential investment treaty liability and scrutiny by 
international arbitrators.
33
  But because existing arbitral jurisprudence 
leaves the door open to such claims, countries report a “chill” on ex-
ercises of their regulatory authority as they hesitate to pass legislation 
that could give rise to similar challenges.
34
 
As these costs pile up, the question becomes whether they are 
offset by the benefits that BITs provide in terms of attracting addi-
tional foreign investment.  The next Section addresses that question. 
B. Evaluation 
BITs are supposed to promote economic cooperation by in-
creasing the flow of FDI, typically from a developed to a developing 
country.  There are two primary mechanisms by which they could do 
so.  The first is to increase FDI between the two States that are par-
ties to a specific treaty by providing assurances of fair treatment in 
the host country to investors from the capital-exporting country.  The 
second is to attract more investment to the developing State from all 
sources by sending a broader signal to investors worldwide about that 
State’s domestic environment for investment.  With both mecha-
nisms, there are empirical studies, as well as reasons in principle, to 
support a pessimistic outlook. 
The first causal pathway is the one that BITs were formally 
designed to use.  As explained in the prior Section, the investor pro-
tection model was created to provide additional treaty-based protec-
tions for investors from the capital-exporting country.  Whereas they 
 
 32. See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, Opinion, How Can Philip Morris Sue Uruguay over Its 
Tobacco Laws?, GUARDIAN (London) (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2015/nov/16/philip-morris-uruguay-tobacco-isds-human-rights (describing 
an arbitration between Philip Morris and Uruguay and calling for the entire investor-State 
dispute settlement system to be abolished).  Philip Morris’s claims against Uruguay were 
recently dismissed.  See Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 590 (July 8, 2016). 
 33. See de Zayas, supra note 32.  In earlier work, I explained in further detail how 
arbitral jurisprudence created this conflict between foreign investors’ rights and the host 
State’s authority to regulate in the public interest, and I proposed tools of interpretation to 
reduce that conflict.  See generally Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-
State Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 295 (2015). 
 34. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and 
the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 346 n.46 (2007) (citing 
“mixed anecdotal evidence” on regulatory chill). 
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might previously have been deterred from investing because of per-
ceived instability in the host State’s domestic system, the presence of 
BIT protections would encourage greater investment by mitigating 
those risks.  This mechanism for increasing FDI views BITs as 
“hands-tying devices” because they create costs for the host State if it 
fails to live up to its treaty commitments.
35
 
Efforts to find evidence of increased FDI specifically between 
the two parties of a particular BIT are referred to as dyadic analyses, 
and most of them have found at most a marginal effect.
36
  A couple 
of studies have found evidence that U.S. BITs produced a boost in 
FDI to the developing country signatory.
37
  But another study looking 
at U.S. FDI flows to a different set of countries during a different 
time period contradicted this finding.
38
 
The second mechanism by which BITs could affect FDI is by 
sending a signal to investors from all States that the host State “is 
generally serious about the protection of foreign investment.”39  The 
signing of BITs suggests, at a minimum, that the State in question de-
sires to attract investment and would therefore be disinclined to take 
measures that would adversely affect its reputation.  Moreover, sign-
ing BITs also creates a more concrete incentive for host States to re-
form their domestic institutions, because improper actions may create 
treaty liability to at least some foreign investors.
40
  Thus, even for-
eign investors not from a country that has entered into a BIT with the 
host State could take other BIT signings into account on the theory 
that they would stand to benefit from general improvements to the 
domestic environment. 
Efforts to measure this signaling effect are referred to as mo-
nadic analyses, which examine aggregate FDI flows from any source 
into capital-importing countries.
41
  The results of these studies are 
more varied than the dyadic analyses.  At least a couple have found 
 
 35. Andrew Kerner, Why Should I Believe You?  The Costs and Consequences of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 73, 76 (2009). 
 36. See Büthe & Milner, supra note 2, at 176–78 (summarizing studies). 
 37. See id. at 177–78. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign 
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1571 (2005). 
 40. Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite:  The 
Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L 
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 5 (2011). 
 41. Büthe & Milner, supra note 2, at 176. 
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BITs to have a significant impact on FDI.
42
  Others, however, have 
found effectively no impact and suggest that prior findings to the 
contrary failed to account for the endogeneity of BIT adoption.
43
  In 
other words, there may be a correlation between BIT adoption and 
FDI increases not because the former causes the latter, but because 
both are caused by another variable, or the latter causes the former.
44
 
A recent study by political scientists Jennifer Tobin and Su-
san Rose-Ackerman attempts to measure the value of signaling more 
precisely by taking into account the quality of host State institutions.  
They conclude that BITs are ineffective when they are used as substi-
tutes for an otherwise unfavorable domestic investment environ-
ment.
45
  However, they find evidence that BITs can have a more sub-
stantial impact when they complement an existing set of effective 
domestic institutions.
46
  They explain this counterintuitive result by 
suggesting that while signing BITs may send a signal about the host 
country’s commitment to attracting foreign investment, “they are not 
the only information about political risk available to investors.”47  
Thus, a country with weak institutions cannot expect that signing a 
BIT will dramatically alter investor perceptions, but a country with 
stronger institutions can use BITs “to lend credibility to [its] other-
 
 42. See Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788, 790 (2004); Neumayer & 
Spess, supra note 39, at 1582. 
 43. See Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:  
Correlation Versus Causation, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, 
supra note 2, at 395, 421–24; see also Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries 
Sign BITs?, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2, 
at 437, 448 (providing evidence that “the signing of BITs was positively correlated with 
previous investment levels” and suggesting that this may occur as the result of lobbying by 
foreign investors already located in the host State). 
 44. See Aisbett, supra note 43, at 422. 
 45. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 2. 
 46. Id.  Others have found similar trends, but noted them more in passing without 
attempting to develop the theoretical explanation that Tobin and Rose-Ackerman offer.  See 
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?  Only a Bit . . . 
and They Could Bite, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, 
supra note 2, at 349, 368; Jason Yackee, Do BITs Really Work?:  Revisiting the Empirical 
Link Between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE EFFECT OF 
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE 
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2, at 379, 391. 
 47. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 5. 
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wise favorable domestic environment.”48 
With both dyadic and monadic analyses, the mixed nature of 
the findings is likely due, at least in part, to poor data quality.
49
  The 
studies also raise a variety of complex methodological issues, such as 
how best to isolate the effects of BITs from other simultaneous 
changes in the domestic environment.
50
  Resolving such methodolog-
ical debates is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For present purposes, it is enough to make two modest points 
about the empirical literature.  First, with only a handful of positive 
studies that might well be outliers, no one would dispute that there is 
ample room for improvement.  Given that BITs impose meaningful 
costs on host States, one would hope to find more robust and con-
sistent evidence that they are succeeding in promoting FDI.  Second, 
it is notable that, to the extent there has been evidence of impact, it 
tends to come from monadic rather than dyadic analyses.  The impli-
cation, most strongly supported by the Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
study, is that BITs are succeeding, if at all, based on their signaling of 
a commitment to reform domestic institutions rather than on promis-
es to protect a particular State’s investors. 
This latter point is significant because my argument for im-
proving the effectiveness of BITs seeks precisely to build on—and 
strengthen—their capacity to promote such reform.  In Part III below, 
I show, based on empirical research outside the context of BITs, that 
the quality of domestic institutions is an important factor in foreign 
investment decisions.  That research, combined with the results of 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman’s study, supports my argument that BITs 
should focus on institutional quality as the optimal path toward great-
er FDI. 
In any event, the initial takeaway at this point is that there is 
some evidence that BITs are already contributing to FDI by signaling 
a commitment to domestic institutional reform.  But at the same time, 
the signal is a modest one, and there is significant potential to en-
hance the impact of BITs by increasing the likelihood that signing 
them actually produces such reform. 
 
 48. Id. at 6. 
 49. See Büthe & Milner, supra note 2, at 178; Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment?  Some Hints from Alternative 
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 410–11 (2011). 
 50. Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows:  An Overview, in 
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:  BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2, at xxvii, lv; 
see also id. at lv–lvi (identifying other difficult issues). 
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II. EXISTING EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS 
The prior Part paints a bleak picture of the international in-
vestment law regime.  On one side of the equation, the investor pro-
tection model creates significant costs for capital-importing States, 
subjecting them to potential treaty liability and thereby placing con-
straints on their regulatory authority.  On the other side, the model 
appears to have only a marginal impact on attracting foreign invest-
ment.  It is no wonder then that developing countries are questioning 
whether continued participation in BITs makes sense.
51
  And to the 
extent they begin withdrawing from BITs or opting out of the inter-
national investment law regime, as some have already done,
52
 that is 
a loss for foreign investors and the capital-exporting States in which 
they are based.  Some commentators take the view that exit is the 
best outcome for developing countries:  the system is so deeply 
flawed that any attempt to realign it is a lost cause.
53
 
At least some participants in the regime, however, have cho-
sen to explore possible ways to reform the system rather than simply 
exiting it.  Commentators have offered a variety of proposals, a few 
of which have begun to be implemented.  This Part explores existing 
reform efforts and proposals to improve upon the status quo, divided 
into the incremental and the more systemic.  I explain why the in-
cremental proposals are likely insufficient, while the more systemic 
proposals are likely unrealistic and in some cases even counterpro-
ductive. 
My focus in this Part is on reform efforts designed to make 
BITs more effective.  There is a separate line of critique that sees in-
ternational investment law as illegitimate, particularly to the extent 
that ad hoc panels of unaccountable arbitrators are empowered to re-
view the actions of democratically elected governments.
54
  Commen-
tators taking this view propose, for example, that international in-
vestment law be construed to be more deferential to State decisions,
55
 
 
 51. I emphasize in other places that increasing FDI is in the interest of capital-
exporting States as well, so the failure of BITs to produce that result is a lost opportunity for 
both sides.  But because developing States are subject to more investment treaty claims, they 
bear the costs disproportionately and thus have more to complain about with the existing 
system overall. 
 52. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 21–23 (2d ed. 2015). 
 53. See Somnorajah, supra note 25, at 61. 
 54. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s 
Legitimacy:  Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 
52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 66 (2011). 
 55. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
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or that the arbitration system be replaced with a standing investment 
court.
56
  There may be some overlap as proposals designed to im-
prove legitimacy may well enhance effectiveness at the same time.  
But the focus of the present discussion is on ideas for improving the 
latter specifically. 
A. Incremental Proposals 
Improving the effectiveness of BITs could mean increasing 
their benefits or reducing their costs.  Most incremental reform pro-
posals are focused on the latter.  They do not grapple with the appar-
ent failure of BITs to increase FDI flows, but are instead concerned 
primarily with pushing back against perceived intrusions on host 
State sovereignty through the aggressive assertion of investor rights. 
The basic concern, alluded to earlier, is that as the scope of 
investor protections has grown, even good-faith exercises of regula-
tory authority may be challenged under BIT provisions like the fair 
and equitable treatment standard.
57
  The prospect of investment treaty 
liability threatens State sovereignty because “State parties to invest-
ment agreements can no longer legislate at will in the public interest 
without concern that an arbitral panel will determine that the legisla-
tion constitutes interference with an investment.”58  Notably, it is not 
only developing countries that are feeling this regulatory constraint.  
As capital has begun to flow in increasing levels from developing to 
developed countries, and developed countries are signing investment 
treaties with each other, even States that are predominantly capital-
exporting have now been on the receiving end of investment treaty 
claims.
59
 
A variety of proposals have been offered to address the intru-
sion concern, and some have begun to be adopted.  One set of sug-
gestions seeks to revise the substance of BIT protections.  That could 
mean adding preambular language emphasizing that the treaty’s 
 
Law Sphere:  The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 
283, 304–05 (2010) (proposing that arbitral tribunals apply a margin of appreciation, 
borrowing the deferential standard used by the European Court of Human Rights in 
reviewing the actions of Member States of the Council of Europe). 
 56. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180–
84 (2007). 
 57. Chen, supra note 33, at 296. 
 58. Choudhury, supra note 7, at 778. 
 59. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation:  
The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 196 (2010). 
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terms should generally not limit the State’s right to regulate in the 
public interest
60
 or language that specifically narrows the scope of 
certain protections.
61
  Thus, for example, the current 2012 version of 
the U.S. Model BIT ties the fair and equitable treatment standard to 
“the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens,”62 which is thought to be narrower than the standard devel-
oped and applied by arbitral tribunals.
63
  A related approach would 
provide for carve-outs identifying specific areas, such as public 
health regulations, that are exempt from any BIT liability.
64
 
Another set of proposals attempts to improve the quality of 
the arbitration process.  For example, Barnali Choudhury argues that 
if arbitrators are going to make decisions that affect the public inter-
est, there needs to be greater transparency to the public as well as op-
portunities for public participation through the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs.
65
  Similarly, commentators have suggested that tribu-
nals review legislation or other State conduct with a greater degree of 
deference
66
 or apply a public law approach that would evaluate regu-
lations purportedly intruding on investor rights under a proportionali-
ty standard.
67
  As noted earlier, these proposals are designed in part 
 
 60. See World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 144.  In this regard, the 
current U.S. Model BIT states that the parties seek to achieve the treaty’s “objectives in a 
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the 
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights.”  Treaty Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment pmbl., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT], http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371. 
pdf.  This marked a change from earlier BITs whose preambles tended to focus solely on 
investor protection and investment promotion.  See Karen Halverson Cross, Converging 
Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 190 (2012). 
 61. See Boone, supra note 5, at 198–99. 
 62. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 60, art. 5. 
 63. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 134.  But see Patrick Dumberry, 
Moving the Goal Post!  How Some NAFTA Tribunals Have Challenged the FTC Note of 
Interpretation on the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Under NAFTA Article 1105, 8 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 251, 271–72 (2014) (describing how some tribunals have 
suggested that the customary international law minimum standard has evolved in the 
direction of the more robust treaty standard). 
 64. See Chen, supra note 33, at 321–22. 
 65. Choudhury, supra note 7, at 809–17. 
 66. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 55, at 304–05. 
 67. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance:  Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global 
Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION:  ICCA INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 5, 51–52 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration Congress Ser. No. 14, 2009). 
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to improve the legitimacy of the arbitration process by providing for 
greater public input and by guarding against overly intrusive arbitral 
review.  But they may also have an impact on effectiveness for simi-
lar reasons:  if tribunals are making better decisions, and as a general 
matter deferring more to host States, the costs of BITs are likely to 
decrease. 
The bottom line is that incremental reforms have gained trac-
tion precisely because they are modest, and because they speak to the 
interests of developed countries that are feeling the costs of regulato-
ry constraint.  It is far from clear that they will actually succeed in 
achieving the intended goals of limiting costs; much depends on how 
arbitrators interpret new provisions and whether they are interested in 
reevaluating old ones.
68
  What does seem clear is that these modest 
proposals will have little impact on the other major concern about 
BITs, namely that they are failing to substantially boost FDI levels.  
These reform efforts are not designed to achieve that purpose and 
contain nothing likely to address that concern.  Thus, there is a clear 
upper limit to how much these efforts would actually accomplish in 
terms of improving the effectiveness of BITs.
69
 
B. Systemic Proposals 
While the literature on BITs has generally focused on incre-
mental changes that leave the existing framework of investor protec-
tion in place, at least some commentators have begun to question the 
viability of that framework.  It is particularly troubling to these critics 
that even when developing countries succeed in attracting FDI, the 
increased investment does not consistently contribute to the host 
State’s economic growth.70  The major alternative that has begun to 
 
 68. Some of the proposals described above would require the adoption of new 
provisions, but others, such as the proportionality test, are arguably within the power of 
tribunals to implement through the interpretation of existing treaties.  See id. 
 69. Stephan Schill, Christian Tams, and Rainer Hofmann argue that the proposals 
discussed in this Section could indeed contribute to host State development—in other words, 
produce benefits and not merely reduce costs.  See Stephan W. Schill et al., International 
Investment Law and Development:  Friends or Foes?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 3, 29–32.  However, their 
argument is that the proposed changes would remove obstacles to the host State’s own 
efforts to advance its development.  See id. at 29 (arguing that the proposed reforms would 
“grant host States sufficient policy space to pursue their development strategies”).  That, of 
course, is a less ambitious goal than designing BITs to affirmatively contribute to FDI or 
economic development. 
 70. See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 5, at v (“[I]t is becoming more and more widely 
accepted that the proper goal in attracting investment is quality, rather than quantity.  In the 
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emerge is a new model focused on host State development.
71
  Com-
mentators in this vein take the view that BITs were never about in-
vestor protection, or even about increasing FDI, in the first place—at 
least from the standpoint of developing countries.
72
  Rather, investor 
protection and increasing FDI were means to the end of furthering 
the development of host States.
73
  This perspective leads to the con-
clusion that BITs should be fundamentally repurposed to address de-
velopment directly, rather than leaving host States to hope that in-
creased FDI (should it in fact arrive) will gradually lead to progress 
in that regard. 
Advocates of what can be called a “development model” pro-
pose two categories of changes.
74
  One category involves crafting 
provisions that help to ensure that FDI actually adds value to the host 
State.  This could mean, for example, drafting an admissions clause 
that permits host States more flexibility to restrict “low-quality FDI” 
that is unlikely to contribute to economic development.
75
  Similarly, a 
development model could remove the now-standard prohibition on 
performance requirements.  As defined by the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), performance re-
quirements “are stipulations, imposed on investors, requiring them to 
meet certain specified goals with respect to their operations in the 
host country.”76  They can involve, among other things, “obligations 
to hire local labor, use locally created inputs, maintain partial or joint 
ventures with locals, export some percentage of goods produced, or 
 
end, if investment does not increase well-being on a sustainable basis, it is not worth having, 
much less actively chasing.”). 
 71. For a comprehensive model developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, see World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 132–61. 
 72. See Yannick Radi, International Investment Law and Development:  A History of 
Two Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE 
GAP, supra note 25, at 69, 73–75. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Such advocates would also generally agree with the incremental reforms described 
in the prior Section—for example, recalibrating investor protections to create the policy 
space host States need to pursue their development agenda.  See supra note 69.  A third 
proposal of incorporating technical assistance provisions is one I also advocate and thus 
return to in Section IV.A below. 
 75. Genevieve Fox, Note, A Future for International Investment?  Modifying BITs to 
Drive Economic Development, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 229, 252 (2014).  As Fox explains, many 
BITs provide for a presumptive right of admission.  See id. 
 76. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:  NEW EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES, at 2, U.N. Sales 
No. E.03.II.D.32 (2003), http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037_en.pdf. 
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transfer technology.”77  Although the trend in recent BITs has been 
toward prohibiting such performance requirements, advocates con-
tend that, if used selectively and appropriately, they can help host 
States better capture the benefits that FDI is supposed to produce.
78
 
A second category of proposed changes is focused on promot-
ing development that is sustainable.  Sustainable development means 
pursuing economic growth in a manner that properly takes into ac-
count social and environmental concerns.
79
  Advocates of a develop-
ment model suggest that BITs can incorporate these concerns by 
placing obligations on investors, thereby correcting the asymmetry 
that exists in current BITs.
80
  For example, firms making certain 
types of investment could be required to perform impact assessments 
that address likely effects on human rights and the environment.
81
  
BITs could also require firms to agree to certain corporate social re-
sponsibility standards and provide for various accountability mecha-
nisms, including civil or criminal liability in the host or home State.
82
 
The development model, if adopted, has the potential to 
meaningfully alter the effectiveness of BITs.  The first category of 
reforms addresses the benefits side of the equation, while the second 
category goes further than the incremental proposals described in the 
prior Section in seeking to reduce costs.  The primary concern is that, 
unlike the incremental proposals, the development model is one-
sided and not pitched at States that predominantly export capital.  It 
may be true that developing countries have always seen investor pro-
tection and increasing FDI as means to the end of advancing their de-
velopment.  But it would be a mistake to equate the motivations of 
 
 77. Fox, supra note 75, at 248 (footnotes omitted). 
 78. Id. at 249–50; see also Boone, supra note 5, at 196 (“Performance-based 
requirements are probably the most powerful regulation method that developing countries do 
not use.”). 
 79. Andrea Saldarriaga & Kendra Magraw, UNCTAD’s Effort to Foster the 
Relationship Between International Investment Law and Sustainable Development, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 
125, 130. 
 80. See id. at 136–37. 
 81. J. ANTHONY VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:  A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 260 
(Aug. 2012), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6th_annual_forum_commonwealth_guide.pdf 
(prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat). 
 82. See Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Overcoming Obstacles 
with Opportunities:  Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustainable Development, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 
93, 118–20; see also VANDUZER ET AL., supra note 81, at 364–65 (describing different 
enforcement mechanisms for investor obligations). 
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one contracting State with the parties’ shared purpose.  In the ab-
sence of a stronger case that the development model is in the interests 
of both sides, the proposed revisions may not be realistic possibili-
ties. 
There is an additional concern that aspects of the develop-
ment model would be counterproductive if adopted.  This is particu-
larly true of the first category of reforms.  Determining what FDI is 
likely to contribute to development and imposing conditions to cap-
ture more of its value will be a complex process to get right, and 
there is a risk that such actions will not only deter particular investors 
but also signal a less favorable environment to the broader business 
community.
83
  The concern applies to a lesser extent to the second 
category of reforms.  Because of the general movement in the inter-
national community toward valuing sustainable development,
84
 the 
incorporation of such principles in BITs would likely be perceived as 
responsible governance rather than as an indication of hostility to 
FDI.  But the concern of deterring investment does not fully disap-
pear because individual firms may be dissuaded and particular BITs 
that overreach in this area may still end up sending a problematic 
signal. 
Advocates of the development model have advanced the con-
versation and generated many useful ideas.  Their more aggressive 
proposals may in fact work for host States that are, for example, rich 
in resources or otherwise seen as attractive markets because they pos-
sess greater leverage in the negotiation process.  Moreover, it is con-
ceivable that in some instances capital-exporting countries will be 
sufficiently motivated by altruism or strategic considerations to enter 
BITs that prioritize sustainable development.
85
  But there are strong 
reasons to doubt that the development model will be viable in many 
or perhaps most instances.  As explained in Section III.C below, the 
model proposed here is intended to be pitched as a better bargain for 
all involved and thus more realistically attainable, even if it does not 
offer everything that advocates of the development model would like 
in an ideal world. 
 
 83. See Fox, supra note 75, at 249–50 (acknowledging this concern for performance 
requirements). 
 84. As one example, the United Nations General Assembly recently adopted a 
resolution identifying seventeen sustainable development goals for the international 
community to pursue.  G.A. Res. 70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
 85. The model may also be appropriate for pairs of developing countries that expect 
capital to flow equally both ways. 
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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM MODEL 
Having described and evaluated the shortcomings of existing 
reform efforts, I turn in this Part to the case for an institutional reform 
model.  The literature on BITs indicates that they are having at best a 
modest impact on increasing FDI.  Meanwhile, empirical studies on 
the determinants of FDI find that domestic institutional quality is one 
key factor.  Section III.A details that evidence.  In light of all the 
available evidence on what works and what does not, Section III.B 
argues for a redesign of BITs to focus on improving domestic institu-
tions in order to increase their effectiveness in promoting FDI.  Final-
ly, Section III.C explains why the institutional reform model has the 
potential to be a better bargain for both sides and thus should be more 
realistically attainable than other systemic proposals that have been 
offered. 
A. The Importance of Domestic Institutions 
Political scientists and economists have extensively explored 
the relationship between domestic political and legal institutions, on 
the one hand, and foreign direct investment, on the other.  Their con-
clusions vary in the extent of the correlation and in their assessment 
of which specific institutional factors matter most.  But the literature 
is generally consistent in concluding that a meaningful correlation 
exists. 
To be clear at the outset, no one suggests that the quality of a 
State’s institutions is the driving factor in a firm’s decision to invest 
there.  Evidence and common sense suggest that the nature and scope 
of the business opportunity provide the initial motivation.
86
  The ab-
sence of political and legal risks is probably never an affirmative rea-
son in itself to invest in a country.  And when those risks are present, 
the investment may nonetheless be deemed justified based on the size 
of the business opportunity, and the risks simply treated as issues to 
be managed.
87
 
 
 86. See John Hewko, Special Report, Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional 
Economies:  Does the Rule of Law Matter?, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 2002, at 71, 73.  
Economic factors that make a host country attractive include “a large domestic market, 
sustainable growth, sufficient economic and infrastructure development and/or high natural 
resources endowment.”  Kyeonghi Baek & Xingwan Qian, An Analysis on Political Risks 
and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Industrialized Economies, 
ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MARKETS, Dec. 2011, at 60, 64. 
 87. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 73–74; see also Yackee, supra note 49, at 435–36. 
Chen_BITs and Domestic Institutional Reform_for final approval (with comments) (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2017  4:35 PM 
568 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [55:547 
Nonetheless, common sense also suggests that the extent of 
those risks would affect a firm’s calculation on whether and how 
much to invest in a particular location, assuming it is sufficiently at-
tractive from an economic perspective.  Weak institutions can in-
crease costs and create inefficiencies for businesses in general, 
whether foreign or domestic.
88
  Moreover, because their investments 
often result in sunk costs, foreign firms are “especially vulnerable to 
any form of uncertainty, including uncertainty stemming from poor 
government efficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak enforcement 
of property rights and of the legal system in general.”89  Thus, the 
quality of a State’s institutions would be expected to affect the level 
of FDI at least at the margins, and the evidence supports such a rela-
tionship. 
Early investigations of this relationship looked for links be-
tween investment and general concepts like political risk or uncer-
tainty.  A typical such study uses a regression analysis to examine 
how one or more specified variables relate to FDI levels in a group of 
countries.  For example, a 1985 study on political and economic de-
terminants of FDI in fifty-four developing countries concluded that 
the variable of political instability significantly reduced the inflow of 
FDI.
90
  Similarly, a 1996 study found a significant correlation be-
tween political risk and FDI inflows, with the impact increasing for 
countries that received higher levels of FDI.
91
  This research, alt-
hough not conclusive, provides support for the reasonable notion that 
decreased risk in a country’s political and legal system would corre-
late with higher levels of investment. 
In addition to regression analyses, researchers have relied on 
surveys of firms for evidence of the relevance of political risk.  Early 
surveys on the subject found “that executives report political instabil-
ity to be the most important variable influencing their foreign in-
vestment decisions, aside from market potential.”92  More recent 
studies have similarly identified political risk as the key constraint on 
 
 88. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al., Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment, 30 WORLD ECON. 764, 765 (2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Friedrich Schneider & Bruno S. Frey, Economic and Political Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 13 WORLD DEV. 161, 166, 173 (1985). 
 91. Kwang W. Jun & Harinder Singh, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Developing Countries, TRANSNAT’L CORPS., Aug. 1996, at 67, 87.  Additional studies are 
collected in Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64. 
 92. Schneider & Frey, supra note 90, at 162 (citing YAIR AHARONI, THE FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS (1966); RAGHBIR S. BASI, DETERMINANTS OF UNITED STATES 
PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1963)). 
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investment when the opportunity is otherwise attractive from an eco-
nomic standpoint.  For example, a 2007 survey of 602 executives 
from multinational corporations around the world identified “political 
risk and governance issues [as] the most prominent barriers to in-
vestment into emerging markets.”93  Moreover, survey responses in-
dicated a perception that political risk was becoming a bigger con-
cern than it had been in the past.
94
  A 2009 survey of a similar 
population likewise ranked political risk first on a list of constraints 
on foreign investment in emerging markets, ahead of factors such as 
macroeconomic stability, access to financing, infrastructure capacity, 
and access to qualified staff.
95
 
More recent studies have broken political risk—or its flipside, 
institutional quality—down into discrete components to better under-
stand their influence on FDI.  Some of these components, such as a 
concern about political violence,
96
 will be set aside because however 
important they may be, they are likely beyond the scope of what an 
economic treaty could meaningfully address.  Others, such as the 
question of regime type, will be bracketed because the research has 
pointed to contradictory conclusions.
97
  The focus for the remainder 
 
 93. Matthew Shinkman, The Investors’ View:  Economic Opportunities Versus 
Political Risks in 2007–11, in WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 2011:  FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK 84, 84, 87 (Laza Kekic & Karl P. 
Sauvant eds., 2007), http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/wip_2007_web.pdf. 
 94. Id. at 87–88. 
 95. WORLD BANK GRP.:  MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, WORLD 
INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL RISK 2009, at 66, 70 (2010), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/ 
2013/11/WIPR_2009.pdf.  The survey defined political risk as “breach of contract by 
governments, restrictions on currency transfer and convertibility, expropriation, political 
violence (war, civil disturbance and terrorism), non-honoring of government guarantees, 
adverse regulatory changes, and restrictions on FDI outflows in home countries.”  Id. at 28. 
 96. See Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 66 (noting that “[w]ar and political violence—
on both the domestic and international level—deter foreign investment”). 
 97. In particular, studies have reached conflicting conclusions on whether having a 
democratic government correlates with more or less FDI.  The competing forces at work are 
readily identifiable.  On the one hand, democratic governance may exacerbate political risk 
by increasing “policy instability” and allowing domestic interest groups to influence 
policymaking to the detriment of foreign firms.  Nathan Jensen, Political Risk, Democratic 
Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040, 1042 (2008).  On the other 
hand, democratic governments may be less politically risky because they are more 
transparent and more sensitive to the reputation harms that would come from mistreatment 
of foreign investors.  Id. at 1041.  Moreover, some scholars have suggested that some 
democracies actually have greater policy stability and that allowing input into the 
policymaking process is on the whole beneficial to foreign firms.  Id.  Given these complex 
dynamics, it is unsurprising that empirical studies have produced contradictory results.  See 
id. at 1043. 
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of this Section will be on the institutional factors that have been iden-
tified as relevant to the foreign investment decision-making process 
and that can serve as a foundation on which to base proposals for a 
new BIT model.  As with the above studies of political risk in gen-
eral, I rely on both regression analyses and survey evidence in draw-
ing the below conclusions. 
First, foreign investors value a transparent and rational poli-
cymaking process.
98
  Undoubtedly the actual substance of a host 
State’s laws is important, as investors will be drawn to environments 
that offer favorable tax laws and financial regulations.
99
  But there is 
independent value in a well-functioning process.  Rules in general are 
likely to be more effective when affected parties have a voice in 
shaping them, and business rules in particular likely benefit from the 
input of firms, including foreign-owned ones.
100
  Moreover, foreign 
investors worried about sunk costs are particularly sensitive to policy 
instability and uncertainty.
101
  While even rational rulemaking insti-
tutions are liable to change course sometimes, they are at least less 
likely to veer off in arbitrary directions. 
Second, foreign investors value an efficient bureaucracy.
102
  
Apart from the institutions that create laws and regulations, business-
es must be concerned about the range of government officials who 
implement and administer them.  Excessive red tape interferes with 
the efficient conduct of business.
103
  Corruption similarly “produces 
 
 98. See Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64–65. 
 99. See Christian Daude & Ernesto Stein, The Quality of Institutions and Foreign 
Direct Investment, 19 ECON. & POL. 317, 322, 327 (2007) (finding that regulatory quality, 
defined to reflect the “content of policies,” has the largest impact on the volume of FDI). 
 100. Hewko, supra note 86, at 76. 
 101. Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64 (noting that “policy instability and arbitrary 
regulation in FDI-related policies create uncertain investment environments and hurt the 
profitability of foreign investments”). 
 102. Busse & Hefeker, supra note 6, at 407 (finding “bureaucratic quality [to be] 
positively associated with FDI flows”); Daude & Stein, supra note 99, at 321–22, 327 
(finding that government effectiveness, defined to include “indicators on the quality of 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the quality of public service provision, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to its policies,” has a significant effect on 
FDI); Drabek & Payne, supra note 6, at 788 (citing “[a]dministrative inefficiency [as] 
probably today the most frequently observed deterrent to FDI”). 
 103. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 74 (“Nothing exasperates an investor more than the 
need to shuffle from ministry to ministry or to negotiate a seemingly endless bureaucratic 
maze where everyone and no one is in a position to resolve issues or grant approvals.”); see 
also SCOTT YUNXIANG GUAN, CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS:  FROM MONOPOLY 
TOWARDS COMPETITION 133–34 (2003) (describing how excessive bureaucratic discretion 
has created problems for investors in the telecommunications industry in China); Mark Dutz 
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bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty, and raises costs,”104 with the add-
ed concern of forcing investors to choose between forgoing an oppor-
tunity entirely and paying a bribe that could lead to criminal liabil-
ity.
105
  By contrast, an efficient bureaucracy allows firms to reduce 
costs and minimize distractions as they focus on their actual value-
creating business activity. 
Third, foreign investors value an independent judiciary capa-
ble of enforcing contract and property rights.
106
  Scholars have long 
noted the connection between a strong judiciary and a hospitable en-
vironment for investment, emphasizing that even the “best” substan-
tive law will be of little value in the absence of effective court en-
forcement.
107
  Foreign investors, like all commercial actors, depend 
on the presence of efficient and impartial courts to ensure that their 
contract and property rights will be protected.
108
  Backlogged courts 
with slow processing times, or judges who are subject to bribery or 
government influence, interfere with business activity by negating 
that expectation.  Outside the context of commercial disputes, a 
strong judiciary also provides a valuable check on arbitrary policy-
making and other forms of government overreach, thus contributing 
to good governance more broadly.
109
 
In short, foreign investors are attracted to host States with ef-
fective lawmaking, administrative, and judicial institutions.  The pre-
 
et al., Turkey’s Foreign Direct Investment Challenges:  Competition, the Rule of Law, and 
EU Accession, in TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 261, 
275 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Sübidey Togan eds., 2005) (noting how “insufficient respect 
for the rule of law,” including the “uneven application of bureaucratic red tape,” can 
“profoundly damage any country’s investment climate”). 
 104. Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment, 33 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 291, 292 (2002). 
 105. See Drabek & Payne, supra note 6, at 785. 
 106. See Glen Biglaiser & Joseph L. Staats, Do Political Institutions Affect Foreign 
Direct Investment?  A Survey of U.S. Corporations in Latin America, 63 POL. RES. Q. 508, 
517 (2010) (summarizing survey results as “suggest[ing] that CEOs prefer countries that 
provide investment safety linked to adherence to rule of law, upholding of private property 
rights, [and] use of a relatively efficient and effective court system”).  The same authors 
conducted a regression analysis of judicial institutions in Latin America and found that 
“countries in the region with greater judicial strength and rule of law tend to receive higher 
levels of FDI.”  Joseph L. Staats & Glen Biglaiser, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin 
America:  The Importance of Judicial Strength and Rule of Law, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 193, 200 
(2012) [hereinafter FDI in Latin America]. 
 107. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS:  THE RULE OF LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93 (2006). 
 108. See FDI in Latin America, supra note 106, at 193–94. 
 109. See id. at 194. 
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ceding three factors flesh out what that looks like, but the basic point 
is straightforward and intuitive.  The next Section addresses how 
these factors can lay the foundation for a new BIT model premised 
on domestic institutional reform. 
B. Translation to BITs 
Given the evidence that strong institutions that reduce politi-
cal risk help to attract foreign investment, I argue that BITs should be 
redesigned to promote domestic institutional reform.  Before devel-
oping that argument, I pause to address why the investor protection 
model fails to address these same political risk concerns.  Recall that, 
as described in Section I.A, political risk was the very problem BITs 
were supposed to help overcome.  But the empirical evidence dis-
cussed in Section I.B suggested that BITs are not seen as adequate 
substitutes for weak domestic institutions, and it is worth elaborating 
on why that may be so. 
Consider first the option of arbitration, which was intended to 
allow foreign investors to bypass a weak or potentially biased domes-
tic judiciary.  But it is in fact an incomplete solution.  The host 
State’s courts may still be needed to adjudicate non-treaty-based dis-
putes (either with the State itself or with private parties) and to en-
force arbitral awards.
110
  Thus, the quality of the legal system still 
matters to foreign investors, as they cannot expect to avoid contact 
with it entirely.  Relatedly, despite the perception that the investor-
State arbitration regime is biased in favor of investors, some evidence 
exists to suggest that investors are routinely disappointed in the out-
comes of that process.
111
 
Moreover, apart from encounters with the legal system, for-
eign investors have reason to be concerned about the quality of gov-
ernance more generally.  The ability to enforce legal rights is un-
doubtedly important, but not every wrong or inefficiency caused by a 
weak institution produces a cognizable legal claim, under BITs or 
 
 110. See Franck, supra note 34, at 369–70 (describing the role of national courts in 
enforcing arbitral awards and adjudicating domestic law disputes); cf. Daniel Berkowitz et 
al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 163, 167 (2004) 
(noting, in the context of international trade, that although private parties may attempt to 
contract for private dispute resolution, they may still need domestic courts to enforce 
compliance with any arbitral ruling). 
 111. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.  Of course, it may be that investors 
are feeling disappointed because they have been bringing unmeritorious claims or 
overstating their damages, but there is at least reason to think that access to arbitration is far 
from a panacea for harmed foreign investors. 
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otherwise.  Firms that are concerned about an inefficient bureaucracy 
or arbitrary policymaking are thus unlikely to be fully reassured by 
the substantive protections that BITs provide.  And so it is not sur-
prising that empirical studies have generally painted a pessimistic 
picture about the capacity of BITs to increase bilateral FDI flows. 
What about the second mechanism by which BITs were sup-
posed to contribute to FDI growth—by sending a broader signal that 
the host State is committed to improving its environment for invest-
ment?  The studies on this effect were slightly more promising, and 
commentators have argued that signing BITs should in fact create in-
centives for domestic reform.
112
  But this impact has not been con-
sistently discernible, and the more nuanced study by Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman finds that BITs attract FDI primarily when the host State 
already has effective domestic institutions.
113
  Adequate existing in-
stitutions are needed because investors have access to other infor-
mation, and if that information suggests a “weak investment envi-
ronment,” the signal sent by the signing of a BIT is of negligible 
value.
114
 
Accordingly, even those who defend the existing model on 
the ground that it incentivizes host State reform would likely agree 
that the model is not optimally designed for that purpose.  Any effect 
that BITs as currently constituted have on domestic institutions is a 
byproduct of the investor protection provisions rather than a designed 
feature.  Host States may decide against particular reforms or reform 
in general because the expense of pursuing it outweighs the costs of 
noncompliance.  Or they might simply try and fail.  Foreign inves-
tors, in turn, may give some weight to the presence of a BIT in evalu-
ating the risks of investing in a particular State, but the signal is not 
reliable enough to produce a substantial impact. 
The question then becomes whether a redesigned BIT that 
specifically focuses on the improvement of host State institutions 
 
 112. See Celine Tan, Reviving the Emperor’s Old Clothes:  The Good Governance 
Agenda, Development and International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:  BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 147, 159 (“Host state 
signatories to [international investment agreements] risk incurring significant costs if they do 
not reform domestic institutions to give effect to treaty standards of protection, including 
direct costs of litigation for treaty breaches and any ensuing compensatory damages to the 
foreign investor as well as indirect costs, such as the . . . effects of reputational loss.”); see 
also Benjamin K. Guthrie, Note, Beyond Investment Protection:  An Examination of the 
Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1151, 1192–97 (2013) (describing more specific mechanisms by which BITs would 
influence domestic institutions). 
 113. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 114. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 2. 
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could have a more substantial impact on FDI.  Reserving the question 
of how such improvements are to be achieved for the next Part, I con-
tend that, if BITs can facilitate such changes, increased FDI is likely 
to follow for two reasons.  First, as the host State’s environment for 
investment begins to improve, foreign investors should take notice 
and adjust their decisions accordingly.  Notably, any resulting in-
crease in FDI in this scenario would be more sustainable, because it 
would be based on concrete progress on the ground rather than on the 
abstract signaling that the investor protection model offers.  Second, 
once BITs could be shown to facilitate institutional reform on a con-
sistent basis, the previously limited signaling value would become 
more meaningful.  In other words, foreign investors could now more 
reasonably rely on the signing of BITs to indicate that positive 
changes in the host State were forthcoming, and so the benefits of in-
creased investment could arrive before the changes themselves. 
Two caveats should be acknowledged so as not to exaggerate 
the potential value of a redesigned BIT.  First, as noted above, the ab-
sence of political risk is generally not an affirmative reason to invest 
in a particular State.
115
  Thus, there is a limit to how much can be ac-
complished through institutional reform; investors must still see an 
economic opportunity for the removal of risk barriers to have an im-
pact.  Second, studies suggest that firms do not conduct systematic 
evaluations of political risk, but rather make assessments in an ad 
hoc, impressionistic manner.
116
  This suggests that even if BITs begin 
to produce concrete improvements in host State institutions, any cor-
responding increases in FDI may not happen immediately and will 
depend on the gradual evolution of perceptions among the business 
community.  Relatedly, recent survey evidence suggests that inves-
tors possess only a “low level of familiarity with BITs”  and that they 
have “a low level of influence over FDI decisions.”117  Given increas-
ing media coverage of BITs as a result of high-profile investor-State 
disputes, investor awareness may well be on the rise, but to the extent 
this lack of familiarity persists, it would limit the signaling value that 
 
 115. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 74 (noting that investors’ risk perceptions are “rarely 
based on a thorough understanding of the political, social, legal, and cultural situation in the 
country, but, rather, on information obtained from newspaper headlines and television news 
reports back home, anecdotes from previous trailblazers, [or] perceptions as to what their 
competitors were thinking and doing”); Yackee, supra note 49, at 431 (describing a study 
finding that “political risk analysis was often weakly institutionalized, with managers often 
possessing only a ‘diffuse, subjective, and impressionistic’ perception of political risk” 
(quoting STEPHEN J. KOBRIN, MANAGING POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  STRATEGIC 
RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 113 (1982))). 
 117. Yackee, supra note 49, at 429. 
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even a redesigned BIT would have. 
The above caveats notwithstanding, the point remains that 
there is significant unharnessed potential in BITs to produce more 
gains in FDI for developing countries.  The institutional reform mod-
el may help realize that potential. 
C. A Better Bargain 
As alluded to earlier, the investor protection model has been 
referred to as a grand bargain, in which developing countries agree to 
limit their sovereignty as a way to attract foreign investment from 
developed countries.
118
  But as things currently stand, the evidence 
suggests that host States are incurring the costs of regulatory con-
straint without substantial corresponding gains in increased FDI.  
Moreover, as noted in Section II.B, the foreign investment that de-
veloping countries have received has not consistently led to the eco-
nomic growth that provided the motivation for their participation. 
The institutional reform model has the potential to be a better 
bargain for both sides.  First, it should be remembered that it is in the 
two States’ shared interest to increase FDI:  developing countries 
want to attract it, but developed countries are also seeking to cultivate 
more and better outlets for their investors.  Thus, if the empirical evi-
dence indicates that better domestic institutions in the host State are 
key to promoting FDI, then both States stand to benefit from such 
improvements.  This argument distinguishes my proposal from the 
ones I criticized in Section II.B as politically unrealistic.  Whereas a 
shift toward emphasizing the development of host States would likely 
be resisted as a one-sided repurposing, the institutional reform model 
can be pitched as an opportunity to produce gains for both States. 
At the same time, the value of improved domestic institutions 
to the host State specifically should not be overlooked.  An important 
feature of the proposed model is that it builds in benefits for the host 
State, rather than leaving them contingent on some trickle-down ef-
fect.  In other words, while the ultimate shared goal of increasing FDI 
remains the same, the proposed model seeks to improve host State in-
stitutions as the means toward that end.  And such improvements 
would of course be beneficial in and of themselves, apart from the 
value they bring in increased FDI.
119
  By contrast, the investor pro-
 
 118. See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. 
 119. An important caveat to this point is that reforms designed to please foreign 
investors or the business community do not necessarily spillover into benefits for the public 
at large.  I plan to return to this question of when and how such benefits can be more broadly 
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tection model assumed that increased FDI would eventually result in 
benefits to the host State but did nothing to promote that outcome.
120
  
Thus, while the institutional reform model may not go as far as advo-
cates for developing countries would prefer, it is designed to produce 
value for them immediately, even as it seeks to more effectively ac-
complish the shared goal. 
A shift to an institutional reform model is not without costs, 
particularly to capital-exporting States.  Some of the proposals dis-
cussed in the next Part require an investment in resources by devel-
oped countries; others could be perceived as a contraction of the pro-
tections afforded to foreign investors.  On the flipside, any payoff in 
terms of increased FDI may take time to materialize.  Thus, the value 
proposition to capital-exporting States may not be as self-evident as it 
is to host States.  That said, given the dissatisfaction among develop-
ing countries with the current model, ideas to improve the arrange-
ment from their perspective are sorely needed.  The approach I pro-
pose is a more plausible compromise than others that have been 
offered, with at least the potential to be a better bargain for all partic-
ipants in the long run. 
IV. THREE PROPOSALS 
This Part begins the conversation about how BITs can be de-
signed to foster improvements to the domestic institutions of devel-
oping countries.  The first proposal would most directly serve that 
purpose, but would also be the farthest afield from what BITs cur-
rently contain and would require a substantial investment of re-
sources.  The second and third proposals would help to facilitate ra-
ther than directly produce institutional reform, but could be 
implemented more readily into the existing structure.  The three pro-
posals could work well together or be adopted independently of each 
other. 
As noted in the Introduction, I have bracketed the question of 
how, if at all, the substantive protections generally provided for under 
the current model should be revised.  My analysis of the shortcom-
ings of existing BITs would support an argument for reducing foreign 
investor protections because the evidence suggests they may be pro-
ducing greater costs than benefits.
121
  Others have made proposals for 
 
distributed in future research. 
 120. See supra notes 70–73. 
 121. See supra Section I.B. 
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how that recalibration should be done, including ideas I summarized 
in Section II.A.  My primary critique of those proposals was that they 
addressed only the costs of BITs and offered nothing to improve their 
capacity to promote FDI.  But the proposals I offer here to enhance 
the benefits side of the equation may well be compatible with a sim-
ultaneous effort to reduce the costs. 
A. Conditional Aid and Technical Assistance 
The first proposal is that BITs should include commitments 
by developed States to provide conditional aid and technical assis-
tance to developing countries to promote the institutional reform 
needed to enhance FDI.  Of the proposals offered in this Part, this 
one most directly addresses the issue of improving host State institu-
tions.  It is also the farthest afield from what the current model of 
BITs encompasses.  Rather than focusing solely on reciprocal com-
mitments by each State to the other’s investors, these novel provi-
sions would create a deeper partnership between the two States them-
selves.  The provisions would require a significant investment of 
resources by the developed State in particular, but they would have 
the potential to trigger meaningful reforms and ultimately yield 
greater benefits for both sides. 
While this Article is the first to make the case for expressly 
linking BITs and domestic institutional reform, the concept of foreign 
aid to assist in capacity building has a long history.  Foreign aid in 
general was traditionally focused on stimulating economic develop-
ment by, among other things, supporting infrastructure improve-
ments, delivering new technologies, and providing for basic needs.
122
  
Countries acting individually, as well as collectively through interna-
tional organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, provide aid based on a combination of altruistic and self-
interested motives.
123
  Since around the 1980s, countries and organi-
zations providing aid began to focus on promoting the rule of law in 
recipient States.
124
  These efforts grew out of a recognition that aid 
on the whole was failing to contribute to the recipient country’s 
 
 122. Steven Radelet, Foreign Aid, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 98, 105 (Amitava Krishna Dutt & Jaime Ros eds., 2008). 
 123. Id. at 101–05.  Self-interested motives include advancing the foreign policy agenda 
of the donor state or promoting “the economic interests of certain firms or sectors in the 
donor country.”  Id. at 104. 
 124. Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 15, 15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
Chen_BITs and Domestic Institutional Reform_for final approval (with comments) (Do Not Delete) 6/5/2017  4:35 PM 
578 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [55:547 
growth and development.
125
  The missing ingredient was thought to 
be the rule of law and institutions that could put the received aid to 
effective use, and so aid for the specific purpose of institution-
building became a priority.
126
 
The rule of law continues to serve as a guiding ideal for social 
progress, and empirical evidence exists to support the belief that its 
presence in a State is correlated with effective development.
127
  But 
actually translating the high-level ideal into concrete steps that can be 
taken to achieve it has proved to be elusive.
128
  The reasons for this 
are many.  One is a disagreement about what the rule of law actually 
entails.  Rachel Kleinfeld finds that the concept has been “used to 
imply at least five different goals:  making the state abide by law, en-
suring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing ef-
ficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights.”129  Actors 
working to promote the rule of law refer inconsistently to these dif-
ferent definitions, and some remain “hotly disputed.”130 
There are also problems with foreign aid programs in general 
that show up in the rule-of-law aid context specifically.  First, foreign 
aid may have the effect of reinforcing the status quo.  Ineffective 
governments that citizens would have sought to replace may survive 
longer because aid allows them to provide a minimally adequate level 
of services.
131
  Political elites who lack the will to seek reform may 
use aid money for patronage purposes, enabling themselves to retain 
their positions or status.
132
  Aid money also creates more opportunity 
 
 125. Id. at 16–17. 
 126. Id. at 17 (“It has become a new credo in the development field that if developing 
and postcommunist countries wish to succeed economically they must develop the rule of 
law.”). 
 127. Tjaša Redek & Andrej Sušjan, The Impact of Institutions on Economic Growth:  
The Case of Transition Economies, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 995, 998–1002 (2005) (summarizing 
studies). 
 128. The parallels to the present Article are hard to miss.  The institutions that are 
important to attracting foreign investment are likewise key to fostering economic growth 
from a purely domestic standpoint.  See id. at 999 (describing a study in which “property 
rights” and “regulatory institutions” were found to have a significant impact on economic 
growth). 
 129. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE 
RULE OF LAW ABROAD:  IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 124, at 31, 34–35. 
 130. Id. at 35. 
 131. Radelet, supra note 122, at 107–08. 
 132. See Katherine Erbeznik, Note, Money Can’t Buy You Law:  The Effects of Foreign 
Aid on the Rule of Law in Developing Countries, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 873, 885–
86 (2011). 
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for corruption, when new public funds are available to be used for 
various forms of private gain.
133
  The lack of progress persists even 
when aid is made on a conditional basis.  That happens both because 
metrics to measure progress are difficult to identify and because aid 
providers have a strong bias toward continuing to disburse funds re-
gardless of their effectiveness.
134
 
Although these are serious obstacles, there are nonetheless 
potential solutions and reasons to believe that BITs can provide a 
proper setting for implementing them.  As an initial point, regarding 
the definitional problem, this Article proposes focusing on the issue 
of improving institutions rather than seeking to advance particular 
substantive ends.  In other words, the goal is to reform key institu-
tions that are known to be necessary to support the rule of law.  Some 
aid providers use precisely this same approach.  In a report on U.S. 
rule-of-law aid efforts, for example, the Government Accounting Of-
fice defined the scope of its subject as follows: 
Throughout this report, we use the phrase “rule of 
law” to refer to U.S. assistance efforts to support legal, 
judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts undertak-
en by foreign governments.  This term encompasses 
assistance to help reform legal systems (criminal, civ-
il, administrative, and commercial laws and regula-
tions) as well as judicial and law enforcement institu-
tions (ministries of justice, courts, and police, 
including their organizations, procedures, and person-
nel).
135
 
Kleinfeld identifies several problems with this institutional 
approach, most prominently that it may result in providers attempting 
to duplicate their country’s own institutions and produce formal 
change without making a meaningful difference on the ground.
136
  
 
 133. Id. at 886. 
 134. Id. at 891.  Erbeznik elaborates on the incentives facing aid providers, which 
answer to the citizens of donor countries.  “[T]hese citizens,” she explains, “have almost no 
ability to monitor the effect of aid on rule of law reform . . . .  As a result, the success of the 
aid agencies is measured by the volume of input—money given, in other words—as opposed 
to output or real reform.”  Id.  She adds, “The other problem with aid agencies’ incentives is 
that their continued existence depends on the premise that foreign aid can produce reform.  If 
foreign aid is anathema to reform, the aid agency has no purpose and will not continue to be 
funded.”  Id. at 892. 
 135. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/NSIAD-99-158, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:  RULE 
OF LAW FUNDING WORLDWIDE FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993–98, at 1 n.1 (1999), http://www. 
gao.gov/assets/230/227749.pdf (report to congressional requesters). 
 136. Kleinfeld, supra note 129, at 50–52. 
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Although these concerns are valid, they can likely be managed by ef-
fective partnering of the sort I recommend below, which is intended 
to allow recipient States to customize institutions to advance their tai-
lored vision of the rule of law. 
Apart from the definitional concern, the two major steps that 
can be taken to improve the effectiveness of aid are obtaining effec-
tive buy-in from the recipient State and requiring accountability.  
BITs can help carry out these goals by establishing a committee con-
sisting of representatives of both States that is charged with adminis-
tering funds for defined purposes, establishing metrics for perfor-
mance, and monitoring progress on those metrics.  As I will explain, 
while these steps could be taken outside the context of a BIT rela-
tionship, there is reason to believe they will hold particular promise 
in this specific setting. 
Obtaining buy-in starts with giving the recipient State a voice 
in shaping reform.  This has the benefit of increasing the likelihood 
that the recipient State will actually do the work of pursuing reform.  
Such buy-in is critical because otherwise “recipient governments will 
do just enough to guarantee a continued flow of revenue.”137  Effec-
tive reform, by contrast, depends on state actors developing a norma-
tive “commitment to reform even when no one is watching.”138  
Equally important, giving the recipient State a voice makes it more 
likely that proposed reforms will be properly tailored to address the 
State’s needs and fit the State’s culture.  Experience shows that States 
cannot merely copy the institutions of another and expect them to 
take hold and produce the rule of law.
139
  Giving the recipient State a 
role in shaping the relevant institutions would go a long way toward 
establishing the foundation for their ultimate success. 
Once buy-in is achieved, there must also be accountability.  
That starts with setting appropriate benchmarks, which in itself is not 
a simple task.  Past efforts at making aid conditional have tended to 
focus on formal change, such as the enacting of laws and regulations 
or the creation of an institution.
140
  Those are, of course, only first 
steps, as laws must actually be enforced and institutions must actual-
 
 137. Erbeznik, supra note 132, at 887. 
 138. Id.  Gustav Ranis goes a step further to argue that reform packages should be 
designed entirely by the prospective recipient, with donors responding more passively like a 
commercial bank.  Gustav Ranis, Towards the Enhanced Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, in 
FOREIGN AID FOR DEVELOPMENT:  ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND THE NEW AGENDA 57, 60 
(George Mavrotas ed., 2010).  While this goes farther than my proposal, the underlying 
rationale of increasing the recipient country’s sense of ownership is the same. 
 139. See Kleinfeld, supra note 129, at 51–52. 
 140. See Radelet, supra note 122, at 111–12. 
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ly function properly.  But metrics on effectiveness are hard to devel-
op, particularly when progress is likely to be gradual.  There is no 
simple solution to these difficulties, except to emphasize that a long-
term commitment to the process at least has a chance of resolving 
them.  Apart from benchmarks and metrics, accountability also re-
quires monitoring and actual enforcement of conditions.  As noted 
earlier, a key reason that conditional aid has previously been less ef-
fective than expected is that aid providers have failed to follow 
through on the enforcement of conditions.
141
 
Other commentators have proposed steps along these same 
lines outside the BIT context,
142
 and while they have been attempted 
on a fairly limited basis, there are examples of success stories.
143
  I 
do not suggest that a BIT relationship is necessary to implement 
these measures, but rather that they have particular potential in a BIT 
context.  The main reason is that BITs represent—to some extent un-
der the present model, but even more so under the proposed institu-
tional reform approach—a commitment to long-term economic coop-
eration, thereby creating the conditions for a more effective 
partnership.  The capital-exporting State, seeking to cultivate a for-
eign market for its investors, will have a more specific, vested inter-
est in seeing aid succeed than a typical aid provider does.  Likewise, 
the longer time horizon under which the contracting States would be 
working allows for more effective cooperation between them in the 
slow process of reform, from the development of ideas through the 
supervision of implementation. 
With regard to accountability in particular, there is a further 
reason why performance within the BIT relationship may improve on 
past failures.  Unlike traditional aid agencies, which are predisposed 
to dispense aid regardless of performance because they have no other 
function, the joint committee charged with overseeing reform would 
be involved in all parts of the process and so be better equipped to 
stay focused on the ultimate objective.  For such a committee, with a 
clear mandate to produce measurable results, aid would clearly be a 
 
 141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Radelet, supra note 122, at 113–15; see also Carrie Manning & Monica 
Malbrough, Bilateral Donors and Aid Conditionality in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:  The 
Case of Mozambique, 48 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 143, 147 (2010) (“In general, conditionality 
has been found to work best when key actors in recipient countries buy into the goals of 
conditionality, when the performance can be verified and then rewarded or punished in a 
timely and predictable manner, and when it is clear where responsibility lies for the 
implementation of the required measures.”). 
 143. See Manning & Malbrough, supra note 142, at 164–65 (describing the reasons that 
conditional aid succeeded in Mozambique’s peacebuilding efforts). 
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means to an end rather than a de facto end in itself.  Accordingly, it 
would be more realistic to expect such a committee to resist the 
temptation to overlook conditions and instead to use its broader set of 
tools to keep looking for solutions to the seemingly intractable prob-
lems. 
As may already be implicit in the above discussion, BITs 
providing for conditional aid should also include provisions on tech-
nical assistance.  Technical assistance is aimed at “helping develop 
human, institutional and regulatory capacities in developing coun-
tries.”144  Activities may include “drafting constitutions and legisla-
tion; advising on institutional reform; establishing new institutional 
frameworks; . . . advising on judicial reform; offering short training 
courses on specific legal topics; and providing . . . guidance on legal 
education generally.”145  It would be a natural extension for the joint 
committee in charge of dispensing conditional aid to take on the role 
of coordinating expertise-sharing between the countries. 
The obstacles to effective technical assistance largely parallel 
those to conditional aid.  In particular, there is a risk that experts 
from the developed State will attempt to simply “transplant[]” the 
rules and systems of their country to the host State without adequate 
understanding of “the political . . . and social . . . context in which it 
operates.”146  The solutions likewise track those I propose above.  Ef-
fective technical assistance requires proper buy-in from the host 
State:  “It is the responsibility of domestic policymakers, supported 
by their legal experts, to choose the scope and direction of the coun-
try’s legal reform in conformity with the country’s needs and special 
characteristics.”147 
Technical assistance is primarily offered by multilateral insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and UNCTAD.
148
  Although provi-
 
 144. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/TNCD/Technical-Assistance-and-Capacity-Building-.aspx 
(last visited June 5, 2017). 
 145. Julio Faundez, Legal Technical Assistance, in GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LAW:  
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 1 (Julio Faundez ed., 
1997). 
 146. Id. at 5. 
 147. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Framework for Development:  Role of the World Bank 
in Legal Technical Assistance, 23 INT’L BUS. LAW. 360, 366 (1995) (emphasis omitted). 
 148. See id. at 365.  UNCTAD specifically works with States “to formulate international 
investment rules that effectively foster sustainable development and inclusive growth.”  
International Investment Agreements (IIAs), U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctad. 
org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/International-
Investment-Agreements-(IIAs).aspx (last visited June 5, 2017). 
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sions on technical assistance have not, to my knowledge, appeared in 
BITs, they have been proposed by advocates of the development 
model.
149
  These advocates acknowledge that “it will be easiest to 
negotiate technical assistance commitments that advance home state 
interests” and propose as an example “supporting improvements in 
the transparency and efficiency of host state regulation.”150  That, of 
course, is the idea behind the institutional reform model in general—
that it has the potential to advance home State interests by improving 
the quality of the host State as a site for investment. 
In sum, rule-of-law values and institutions are not easily ex-
ported, even when the exporting country offers monetary aid and 
technical expertise.  Nonetheless, there are recognized solutions to 
address the primary obstacles and reasons to believe they hold partic-
ular potential to succeed in the context of a BIT relationship. 
B. Dispute Resolution 
Conditional aid and technical assistance are the most direct 
ways to foster institutional reform and have the broadest potential 
reach.  I turn now to the first of two proposals aimed at facilitating 
the reform of specific institutions.  One of the consistent findings in 
the empirical literature described earlier is that the quality of the host 
State’s judiciary is important to foreign investors.151  There is a con-
cern, however, that the standard dispute resolution provisions con-
tained in existing BITs operate to undermine the domestic courts.  
And even if that concern has not been conclusively demonstrated, we 
should nonetheless consider whether the provisions could be revised 
so that they affirmatively contribute to strengthening the quality of 
local courts. 
Most BITs contain a standard consent to arbitration.
152
  That 
means that each of the contracting States agrees at the time of the 
BIT signing to allow the other State’s aggrieved investors to elect to 
pursue claims against them in front of a designated arbitral tribu-
nal.
153
  This consent clause serves as a continuing offer that the for-
eign investor accepts when it chooses to initiate arbitration.
154
  Most 
 
 149. See World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 129; see also VANDUZER ET 
AL., supra note 81, at 498–501 (providing a sample provision). 
 150. VANDUZER ET AL., supra note 81, at 496. 
 151. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 152. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 258. 
 153. Id. at 257–58. 
 154. Id. at 258. 
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BITs provide for ICSID as the arbitral body,
155
 but other institutions 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce and London Court 
of International Arbitration, as well as the option of an ad hoc pro-
ceeding, are available.
156
  Some BITs impose certain conditions on 
consent, such as a requirement that local remedies first be exhaust-
ed
157
 or that a certain period of time pass to give the parties a chance 
to resolve the dispute amicably.
158
  Below, I propose adapting these 
very ideas and others so that they work together to facilitate institu-
tional reform. 
By providing an alternative that allows foreign investors to 
bypass the local courts, arbitration was supposed to provide a substi-
tute that would have made domestic judicial reform unnecessary.  
But as explained above, given that arbitration is available only for 
treaty-based claims and arbitral awards may require judicial en-
forcement, foreign investors cannot realistically expect to avoid local 
courts entirely.
159
  And the empirical evidence confirms that the an-
ticipated effect is not occurring.  In addition to the general evidence 
cited earlier that BITs fail to serve as substitutes for weak domestic 
institutions, we have more specific evidence that the arbitration op-
tion in particular does not help to attract FDI.  Jason Yackee attempts 
to isolate the effect of arbitration provisions in a comparative study 
of strong and weak BITs, rather than simply measuring the impact of 
BITs in the aggregate, as most other studies have done.
160
  He defines 
strong BITs as those that have “effective host state pre-consents to 
investor-initiated arbitration” and weak BITs as those that do not 
have such pre-consent.
161
  The study finds that strong BITs are not 
associated with greater foreign investment levels.
162
 
At the same time that the option of arbitration is failing to at-
tract FDI, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that its pres-
ence may weaken the host State’s domestic courts.  Tom Ginsburg 
 
 155. States separately join the ICSID Convention, which does not in itself constitute 
consent to any particular arbitration, but provides a framework of standard clauses and 
procedural rules as well as an agreement that ICSID awards are binding and final.  See id. at 
238–39. 
 156. Id. at 238, 241. 
 157. Id. at 264–67. 
 158. Id. at 268–70. 
 159. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 160. Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the 
Rule of (International) Law:  Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 805, 806–07 (2008). 
 161. Id. at 814. 
 162. Id. at 827–28. 
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contends that when BITs provide investors with access to arbitration, 
the ability to “bypass domestic courts may reduce courts’ incentives 
to improve performance by depriving key actors from a need to in-
vest in institutional improvement.”163  Ginsburg provides preliminary 
empirical support for his thesis, citing evidence that performance on 
a rule-of-law metric declines in the years after a BIT is signed.
164
  
This would suggest that investors, though not adequately assured by 
the option of arbitration to factor it into their location decisions, 
nonetheless come to rely on its availability once in a particular host 
State, to the detriment of the local courts.  If correct, the result would 
be perversely ironic:  a provision intended to appeal to foreign inves-
tors would be not only failing to do so, but also potentially driving 
them away by weakening an institution that does actually influence 
their location decisions. 
Ginsburg’s evidence is far from conclusive, and there are rea-
sons to question whether the effect he identifies is occurring.  For the 
same reason that foreign investors would not perceive arbitration as 
an adequate substitute for weak domestic courts when deciding 
where to invest, it seems unlikely that these investors would lose any 
interest in the quality of the host State’s judiciary merely because ar-
bitration is available.  Domestic courts are still needed to enforce ar-
bitration awards and to resolve domestic law disputes.  Thus, as Su-
san Franck explains, “[I]f one presumes that foreign investors are 
stakeholders who are vital to promoting the rule of law and institu-
tional integrity, their influence does not exit the market purely by 
creating the right to arbitrate treaty claims.”165  Instead, Franck con-
tends, “[P]roperly valuing the potential role of national courts in re-
solving investment disputes suggests that there is a strong incentive 
to develop the rule of law in national courts and promote the integrity 
of the dispute resolution process.”166 
Regardless of whether Ginsburg or Franck is correct as to the 
effect of existing BITs, the question for present purposes is how BITs 
 
 163. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions:  Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 119 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 121.  Others have made similar arguments without empirical support.  See, 
e.g., MARK HALLE & LUKE ERIK PETERSON, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND INVESTMENT TREATIES:  OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 23–24 (Dec. 2005), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research 
%20&%20Publications/poverty/RBAP-PR-2005-Investment-Provisions.pdf (arguing that 
“BITs . . . provide foreign investors with the means of detouring around” domestic 
institutions and thereby reduce “the impetus for [their] broader improvement”). 
 165. Franck, supra note 34, at 370 (footnote omitted). 
 166. Id. 
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can be designed to optimize any influence they have over the domes-
tic judiciary.  I propose combining several ideas that are currently in 
circulation to achieve that effect.  One proposed reform to the arbitra-
tion provision is to permit recourse to arbitration only when the in-
vestor’s home State authorizes it.  Some States have in fact imple-
mented such a requirement by amending their domestic laws.
167
 
Another existing proposal is to reinstate the exhaustion of lo-
cal remedies requirement that existed under customary international 
law but was overridden in most BITs.  Such a requirement would re-
duce the bypassing concern identified by Ginsburg while still pre-
serving the option of arbitration as a last resort.  Franck notes some 
additional advantages: 
Presumably, if foreign investors were required to liti-
gate disputes through domestic courts rather than di-
rectly taking their claims to international arbitration, 
this might build the capacity of local courts by the fol-
lowing:  (1) providing domestic courts with an oppor-
tunity to articulate relevant principles of domestic law; 
(2) increasing the transparency of the system; and (3) 
giving notice to future investors of the relevant do-
mestic legal standards and their application.
168
 
Advocates for the development model have made a similar proposal, 
citing similar benefits.
169
  A small number of BITs, most of them 
older, do include an exhaustion requirement.
170
  More recently, to 
address the concern of delay in domestic court proceedings, a few 
BITs have refined the exhaustion requirement by providing for the 
option of arbitration if the case is not resolved within a given 
timeframe, ranging from six to thirty-six months.
171
 
The provisions just described are motivated primarily by the 
simple goal of reining in the use of arbitration against host States, but 
with some tweaks they can be adapted and combined together to cre-
ate stronger incentives for institutional reform.  Subject to further 
empirical evaluation, and with the caveat that the circumstances in 
particular States may vary, my suggestion combines the above ideas 
as follows.  BITs should reinstate the exhaustion requirement so that 
foreign investors’ first recourse would be to domestic courts.  How-
 
 167. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties:  The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty 
Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 411 (2015). 
 168. Franck, supra note 34, at 366 n.144. 
 169. See VANDUZER ET AL., supra note 81, at 413. 
 170. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 265. 
 171. VANDUZER ET AL., supra note 81, at 412 & n.c. 
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ever, foreign investors would have two potential paths to arbitration:  
if a prescribed time limit for the domestic proceeding is exceeded, or 
if, after a proper decision in the domestic case has been rendered, the 
investor’s home State consents to the arbitration request. 
The rationale behind this proposal is to maximize incentives 
for host States to improve their legal systems.
172
  The proposal here 
puts pressure on host States to reform their judiciaries from the 
standpoints of both efficiency and quality.  If host States know that 
arbitrations may be filed after a certain time period, they will have an 
incentive to improve the efficiency of their courts, since most gov-
ernments would generally prefer to have investment disputes re-
solved in their own system.
173
  Likewise, if they know that arbitra-
tions following exhaustion can be filed only with the consent of the 
investor’s home State, they will have an incentive to build a more 
competent and independent judiciary whose decisions the home State 
will then be more likely to respect. 
As noted at the outset, these changes are designed to facili-
tate, and not directly produce, institutional reform.  But they have the 
potential not only to reduce any negative impact of foreign investors 
bypassing the local judiciaries, but also to affirmatively strengthen 
the courts’ capacity by incentivizing the host State to take action. 
C. Dispute Prevention 
While a revised approach to dispute resolution could incentiv-
ize improvements to the host State’s judiciary, better mechanisms for 
dispute prevention could help foster reforms in other government in-
stitutions.  The proposal is to create a consultation mechanism for 
foreign investors to raise, at an early stage, concerns about problem-
atic legislation or other government conduct.  Such early intervention 
encourages cooperation between the investor and State and can help 
not only with resolving a particular issue, but also with enhancing the 
 
 172. Franck notes that it is not self-evident that increasing the involvement of foreign 
investors in the domestic legal system will necessarily lead to positive reforms.  Franck, 
supra note 34, at 370 n.163.  It would thus be unwise to rely solely on spurring their efforts 
alone. 
 173. Although Franck’s study on the outcomes of investment arbitration suggests that 
States are not losing at the high rate that is sometimes postulated, she nonetheless recognizes 
the common perception that the system is biased in favor of investors.  See Franck, supra 
note 30, at 48–50.  Moreover, even if States do not lose at an unfairly high rate in arbitration, 
they would presumably prefer to resolve investment disputes in their own courts because 
those courts possess greater familiarity with the domestic political context and the legitimacy 
to rule on matters of public concern.  See Chen, supra note 33, at 311–12. 
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capacity of the relevant government institutions. 
Some States have begun implementing ideas along these 
lines.  For example, in 1999, South Korea created an Office of For-
eign Investment Ombudsman, which handles between 300 and 500 
complaints per year.
174
  The subjects of the complaints include labor, 
taxation, environment, finance, and intellectual property issues, 
among others.
175
  While the office initially resolved approximately 
twenty-five percent of disputes, it has progressed to consistently re-
solve in the range of ninety percent in more recent years.
176
  As an 
indicator of success, the country touted, until recently, the fact that no 
investor arbitration claim had been filed against it.
177
  More broadly, 
though no causal claims can be made, it is worth noting that Korea 
has experienced substantial year-over-year growth in FDI, from 
$13.67 billion in 2011 to $20.91 billion in 2015.
178
  The general 
package of reforms that Korea implemented in the late 1990s, which 
included the creation of the ombudsman office along with other FDI-
friendly measures, has been identified as a useful model for other 
countries seeking to increase foreign investment.
179
 
Brazil has taken the concept of an ombudsman office and 
added it to the recent investment agreements it has signed.  Having 
mostly sat out when Latin American countries were signing BITs in 
large numbers in the 1990s, Brazil developed an alternative model 
known as Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of Invest-
ments (“ACFIs”) and signed six of them in 2015.180  The ACFIs have 
been described as curbing the excesses of BITs, primarily by omit-
 
 174. Françoise Nicolas et al., Lessons from Investment Policy Reform in Korea 23, 25 
(OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. 2013/02, 2013), https://www.oecd.org/investment/ 
investment-policy/WP-2013_2.pdf. 
 175. See Resolved Cases—Introduction, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN, http:// 
ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/rsc/case.do (last visited June 5, 2017). 
 176. Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 24–25. 
 177. Id. at 25.  That changed recently when an ICSID arbitration was filed by a U.S.-
based investor in 2012.  See $4.68B Lone Star Versus Korea Hearing Begins in Washington 
DC, KOREA TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.koreatimesus.com/first-hearing-opens-over-
lone-star-asset-sell-offs-in-korea. 
 178. See JEFFREY I. KIM, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 8 
(2016), http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/common.FileDownload.do?file_id=FILE_0000000000 
00346. 
 179. See Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 5–6. 
 180. Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The New Brazilian Agreements 
on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFIs):  Navigating Between Resistance 
and Conformity with the Global Investment Regime 4 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Morosini%20-%20Global%20 
Fellows%20Forum.pdf. 
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ting the fair and equitable treatment provision and excluding inves-
tor-State arbitration.
181
  The key innovation for immediate purposes 
is the provision requiring each State to set up a focal point, which is 
modeled after the Korean ombudsman and provides a mechanism for 
“dialoguing with government authorities to address the suggestions 
and complaints from the other party’s government and investors.”182 
Although Korea’s creation of an ombudsman office shows 
that domestic law can successfully provide for dispute prevention, 
there are potential advantages to creating such mechanisms as part of 
a bilateral treaty framework.  In particular, focal points created under 
the auspices of a BIT can benefit from, as well as deepen, the coop-
erative relationship between the contracting States.  Focal points can 
benefit from this partnership insofar as the States share resources and 
expertise; this may be particularly important for developing countries 
that, unlike South Korea, lack the capacity to unilaterally implement 
the ombudsman concept.  At the same time, the regular flow of 
communication and resource-sharing can only strengthen the partner-
ship and thereby enhance the conditional aid and technical assistance 
programs described in Section IV.A above.  Brazil appears to recog-
nize the value of this cooperative relationship, as the ACFIs have 
paired focal points with the creation of a Joint Committee consisting 
of representatives from each government that helps to facilitate in-
formation exchange and problem solving at the State-to-State lev-
el.
183
 
From the standpoint of fostering institutional reform, I would 
note first of all that an ombudsman office or focal point is a valuable 
institution in and of itself.  To the extent that foreign investors are 
concerned about bureaucratic inefficiency, they would value the 
availability of a one-stop shop where their concerns can be appropri-
ately directed and escalated and regular communication is ensured.  
The early intervention that an ombudsman can provide helps to min-
imize harm to the investor, which in turn may forestall litigation or 
arbitration and, just as importantly, encourage the firm to continue or 
expand its investment presence. 
Apart from its value as an institution that prevents disputes, a 
foreign investment ombudsman can also be the central clearinghouse 
for coordinating broader reforms.  One study analyzing the Korean 
 
 181. See id. at 22–23, 25. 
 182. Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The Brazilian Agreement on 
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI):  A New Formula for International 
Investment Agreements?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Aug. 2015, at 3, 4, https://www.iisd. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-itn-august-2015-english.pdf. 
 183. Id. at 4. 
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office’s impact emphasizes that, in addition to addressing individual 
grievances, it also takes “pre-emptive measures to prevent future 
grievances by encouraging systemic improvements and legal 
amendments.”184  Moreover, the office responded to foreign inves-
tors’ concerns about their ability to participate in the policymaking 
process with the creation of a new mechanism to receive such input 
before regulations are formally adopted.
185
  Systemic reforms are also 
facilitated by regular meetings between representatives of govern-
ment agencies and a Foreign Investment Advisory Council, which 
consists of representatives of foreign chambers of commerce and 
CEOs of foreign firms, to discuss “macro-level issues.”186 
In short, the creation of a foreign investment ombudsman or 
focal point has significant potential not only to prevent specific dis-
putes, but also to foster broader institutional reform.  By using specif-
ic complaints as the impetus for reform conversations, such an office 
would nicely complement the conditional aid and technical assistance 
committee that would approach the same set of issues with more of a 
bird’s-eye view. 
CONCLUSION 
The time is ripe for a new approach to BITs.  Commentators 
have identified a host of flaws in the existing model, and more im-
portantly developing countries are beginning to question whether it is 
still in their interests to participate.  While many scholars focus on 
tinkering with the investor protection approach, these changes would 
at best help limit the costs of BITs without furthering the goal of in-
creasing FDI.  By contrast, advocates for developing countries offer 
systemic proposals that could significantly increase the effectiveness 
of BITs, but in their repurposing of the model do not adequately ac-
count for the distinct interests of the capital-exporting States. 
This Article offers a new model that remains true to the BIT’s 
original, shared purpose, but fundamentally rethinks its underlying 
premises, rejecting investor protection in favor of a focus on the do-
mestic institutional environment.  Drawing on empirical evidence 
showing that the quality of domestic institutions is an important de-
terminant of foreign investment, the Article contends that BITs 
should be redesigned to promote the reform of those institutions.  
 
 184. Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 24. 
 185. See KIM, supra note 178, at 56. 
 186. Id. at 54–55. 
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Prioritizing such reform benefits developing countries directly in a 
way that the investor protection model does not, but it also promotes 
FDI to the benefit of both States and so is more realistically attaina-
ble than other systemic proposals.  And while the revisions proposed 
here are not without costs, such an investment in the international in-
vestment law regime may be necessary for its long-term viability and 
ultimate success. 
